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Landlord's Control of Leased Premises
Albert G. Schleicher*
G ENERALLY THE LANDLORD is not liable to his tenant or one in
the right of the tenant for injuries resulting from the con-
dition of the demised premises. This is so because the lease is
the same as the sale of the premises during the term of the lease.
Possession and control of the premises having been transferred
by the operation of the lease, the liability and the duty for any
injury which may result from the condition of the premises falls
on the tenant." An exception to the general rule is where the
landlord has retained possession and control of a part of the
demised premises. He may be liable to the tenant or one in the
right of the tenant for failure to exercise ordinary care to keep
that part of the premises over which he has retained possession
and control in a reasonably safe condition.2
The problem arises over what portion of the premises the
landlord has retained possession and control, especially when the
lease contains no provision on this subject. The injured tenant
will allege that the defect causing the injury was part of the com-
mon way while the landlord will answer that the injury occurred
on a portion of the demised premises over which he parted with
possession and control.
A landlord is not in possession or control of any part of
the premises where the tenant is in actual possession.3 But
whether the tenant actually is in possession of any part or all of
the premises is dependent upon the facts in each case.4 A review
of the principles and a sampling of various fact situations in-
volving possession and control of the premises may indicate the
manner in which courts approach the problem.
* A.B., Ohio University; LL.B., Western Reserve University; Graduate
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 33 Ohio Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 188.
2 33 Ohio Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 218. Davies v. Kelley, 112 Ohio
St. 122, 146 N. E. 888 (1925).
3 Keiper v. Marquart, 192 Pa. Super. 88, 159 A. 2d 33 (1960) (allocatur
refused); Turner v. Ragin, 229 S. W. 809 (Mo. App. 1921); rehearing den.
April 9, 1921.
4 Guyer v. Horgan, 96 N. H. 288, 75 A. 2d 325 (1950).
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Interior Stairways
An interior stairway of a building is generally not reserved
by the landlord for the common use of the tenant unless in the
ordinary use of the building such a stairway is used by more
than one tenant. The court said in Miller v. Mutual Mortgage
Co.: 5
A consideration entitled to much weight is the situation
of the stairway with reference to the several apartments.
If the enjoyment of the use by different tenants of apart-
ments rented by them necessitate, or is rendered more con-
venient by the use of stairs, the status of which is under
inquiry, this will usually be taken as indicating a retention
of control by the landlord for the common benefit of sev-
eral tenants. If the stairway be so situated as not naturally
to be regarded as intended for a common use by the various
tenants, but only for the use of one of them, this tends to
signify that the parties intended it to be annexed to the
premise included in the lease of such tenant.
The stairway is reserved by the landlord where in the
ordinary use of it several tenants use it for ingress and egress to
their apartments.6 Ordinarily, if the stairway leads to only one
apartment it is deemed part of the demised premises.7 However,
the landlord may signify his intent to reserve the possession and
control of such a stairway by using the stairway in common with
his tenant. The use of such a stairway by the landlord, along
with the tenant, to reach storage rooms s or to repair a sky-
light9 is sufficient to show reservation of possession and con-
trol of that stairway. 10 Retention of the only key to the outside
5 112 Conn. 303, 152 A. 154, 155 (1930).
6 Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N. H. 265, 18 A. 2d 377 (1941); Horan v. Harris,
12 N. J. Misc. 513, 172 A. 730 (1934). An invitee of the second floor tenant
was injured on the interior stairway while descending from the second
floor. The stairway was common because it extended to a third floor resi-
dence apartment. (It would seem that had the injury occurred on the por-
tion of the stairway leading to the third floor apartment, it would be on
an area which is part of the demised premise. See footnote 7.)
7 Miller v. Mutual Mortgage Co., 112 Conn. 303, 152 A. 154 (1930).
8 Weston v. David, 98 Ohio App. 55, 128 N. E. 2d 137 (1954). The landlord
had to go through the tenant's second floor apartment to reach the storage
rooms. Does this reserve the tenant's apartment to the landlord's use?
Surely not. But the reasoning is tempting.
9 Raune v. Doyle, 308 Mass. 418, 32 N. E. 2d 244 (1941). The landlord used
part of the stairway and stair landing opposite the tenant's apartment to
set up scaffolding to repair the skylight which was above the landing. (It
appears that this is an extremely limited use of the stairway.)
10 Schachter v. Cohen, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 88 (1940). But use of the stairway by
(Continued on next page)
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door at the bottom of the stairway and evidence that the stair-
way might be used by other tenants as an emergency exit was
held in Guyer v. Horgan" sufficient facts for the jury to find
that the stairway is common.
In Hammersmith v. Cohn,12 a hall or areaway off to one
side at the bottom of a stairway leading to a single basement
apartment was used to store ash barrels. The stairway was used
by the landlord's janitor to empty the barrels. Whether such
use was sufficient to establish a common stairway was for the
jury. But in Finkelstein v. Schlanowsky,13 where an area only a
few feet wide at the bottom of the stairway was used to store
ash cans and there was evidence that many ash cans were lo-
cated elsewhere in the building in areas provided for that pur-
pose, the stairway was part of the demised premise.
The interior stairway is common where it leads to an area
reserved for the common use of other tenants. Such an area
is common where there is joint use of its facilities by the ten-
ants. Where the tenants share the use of the only water closet
in the building 14 or where each tenant does have his own facility
but the facilities are located on one floor having but one stair-
way for ingress and egress, the stairway is common.35
Exterior Stairways
As with the interior stairway of a building, an exterior
stairway is generally not reserved by the landlord for the com-
mon use of the tenant unless in the ordinary use of the building
such a stairway is used by more than one tenant.16 If the stair-
(Continued from preceding page)
the landlord in order to paint the roof once a year and to do repairs at
the request of the tenant was not sufficient use to show that the landlord
reserved possession and control. It would appear that the use of the stair-
way in the Raune case, footnote 9, to repair the skylight was a singular
use whereas in the instant case the stairway would be used consistently at
least once every year.
11 96 N. H. 288, 75 A. 2d 325 (1950). On separate occasions the landlord
had to unlock the outside door to admit the tenant.
12 132 N. Y. S. 323 (1911).
13 135 N. Y. S. 783 (1912). It is interesting to note that the Hammersmith
case was decided after the first trial of the Finkelstein case. In the sub-
sequent trial of the latter case, evidence was introduced as to the ash
cans at the bottom of the steps although there was no evidence of this
in the first trial. The reviewing court made specific mention of this fact.
14 Crudo v. Milton, 233 Mass. 229, 124 N. E. 30 (1919).
15 The Coventry Leasehold Co. v. Welker, 43 Ohio App. 82, 182 N. E. 688
(1932); Brundrett v. Rosoff, 92 Conn. 698, 104 A. 67 (1918).
16 Rice v. Ziegler, 128 Ohio St. 239, 190 N. E. 560 (1934).
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way is used by more than one tenant it is common even though
another stairway services the same area.17 Even where the
stairway is used by only one tenant, if it can be used by other
tenants it is common.' 8
If the stairway leads to only one tenement it is part of the
demised premises.19 It remains part of the demised premises
even though the lower portion of the stairway is used in com-
mon with other tenants. 20 In such a case, of course, the lower
portion is a common stairway.
If the stairway leads to an area which is used in common it
is not part of the demised premises. This appears to be the same
rule as where an interior stairway leads to a common area re-
served for the use of other tenants. 21 Therefore, the servicing of
the only heating plant in a basement by the tenants 22 or use of
an unfinished portion of a floor for storage purposes and the
hanging of clothes by the other tenants 23 is an indication that
the landlord retained possession and control over the stairway
leading to these areas.
17 Dillehay v. Minor, 188 Iowa 37, 175 N. W. 838 (1920).
18 West v. Hanley, 73 S. D. 540, 45 N. W. 2d 455 (1950); Thiel v. Kern, 34
S. 2d 296 (La. App. 1948); Karines v. Cullen, 183 Mass. 298, 67 N. E. 243
(1903). It is interesting to note that in this case the entrance doorways of
the double house were side by side; and directly in front of the doorways
was a single plank step which extended the width of both doorways and
which rested on blocks at either end. It was held that the step was not
in common. The plank came off when stepped upon by a member of a
tenant's family. It would appear that each tenant could use the plank even
if only to cross it at an angle. If this was so, it could have been argued
that because more than one tenant used the plank (not merely that por-
tion in front of each doorway) the step was common.
19 Pitts v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 160 Ohio St. 129,
113 N. E. 2d 869 (1953). The steps led up from the common yard directly
to the doorway entrance. Flanders v. New Hampshire Savings Bank, 90
N. H. 285, 7 A. 2d 233 (1939). The stairway led directly to the tenement.
Each tenement had its own entrance, porch and steps. Donovan v. Deeves,
167 N. Y. S. 942 (1917). The only separation between two stairways, one
which led to a store and the other to a doorway to apartments, was a space
of an inch or two. A tenant of one of the apartments was injured on the
store stairway. There was evidence that the store stairway was expressly
included in the store lease and that the store tenant and his customers
used the store stairway exclusively.
20 Bowman v. Goldsmith Bros. Co., 63 Ohio L. Abs. 428, 109 N. E. 2d 556
(1952), app. dism. 158 Ohio St. 121 (1952). There was evidence of the
performance of janitorial services on the tenant's portion of the stairway.
21 See footnotes 14 and 15.
22 Murphy v. Illinois State Trust Co., 375 Ill. 310, 31 N. E. 2d 305 (1940).
23 Brand v. Herdt, 45 S. W. 2d 878 (Mo. App., 1932).
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Porches and Platforms
Where the tenant does not have the right to admit or ex-
clude others, it is an indication that a porch is reserved for the
common use of the tenants. In Davies v. Kelley,2 4 a stairway led
up to a second floor porch which extended across the rear of two
apartments each of which had a doorway opening onto the porch.
A member of the family of a downstairs tenant was injured due
to a defect in the porch. Neither of the two rear tenants had the
right or power to have exclusive possession of the entire porch.
Therefore, it was held to be reserved by the landlord. But where
the tenant acquires the power to admit or exclude persons, the
porch becomes part of the demised premises.25
A porch is reserved for the common use of the tenants
where it is used by two or more tenants,26 and even though only
a portion of the porch is used by two or more tenants, the entire
porch is common because of such use.27 In Forguet v. DeSante28
the court said:
24 112 Ohio St. 122, 146 N. E. 888 (1925).
25 Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N. E. 2d 545 (1949). A tenant had
rented the upper two floors of a three floor tenement and subleased all
but a rear apartment on the second floor. The tenant was injured due to a
defect of the second floor porch. The tenant was in possession and control
of the porch because it was part of the premise originally rented from the
landlord.
26 Lubritsky v. Lonergan, 140 Conn. 300, 99 A. 2d 187 (1953); Peterson v.
Brune, 273 S. W. 2d 278 (Mo., 1954); Hinthorn v. Benfer, 90 Kans. 731, 136
P. 247 (1913). The porch was held common but there was evidence
that the two tenants voluntarily divided the use of the porch to keep
their various household goods separated. But in Phelan v. Fitzpatrick, 188
Mass. 237, 74 N. E. 326 (1905), a "platform" was held to be part of the
demised premise even though a common stairway connected the platform
with the one above and below. There was evidence that each tenant used
his platform exclusively; the platform of the injured tenant, where the
injury occurred, contained a water closet.
27 Petrillo v. Maiuri, 138 Conn. 557, 86 A. 2d 869 (1952); Gill v. Jakstas, 325
Mass. 309, 90 N. E. 2d 527 (1949); Conroy v. Maxwell, 248 Mass. 92, 142 N. E.
809 (1924). In Klene v. Rider, 48 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 73 N. E. 2d 378 (1947), the
porch was held to be for the joint use of each tenant and part of the de-
mised premise! The porch was undivided and extended the width of the
rear of a duplex. It was accessible only through the bedroom doorways
of each apartment. However, when witnesses testified, they spoke of
"our" side of the porch and the "other" (tenant's) side. This apparently
impressed the court.
28 110 Conn. 367, 148 A. 139, 140 (1930); Schneider v. Dubinsky Realty Co.,
344 Mo. 654, 127 S. W. 2d 691 (1939). It was held not necessary for the other
tenant to pass over the portion of the injured tenant's porch to reach a
stairway. However, there was also evidence that the landlord swept the
area, that other tenants strung clothes lines on the porch, that it was used
for the temporary storage of garbage.
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Where a portion of a porch is plainly reserved for a com-
mon use and the lease is silent, another portion shall not
be held to be annexed to a particular tenement unless the
intent of the parties to annex it appears with reasonable
certainty.
The landlord cannot argue that only so much of the porch
as is necessary for the use of the other tenants to reach the
common stairway is reserved for the common use.29 It does not
matter where on the porch the injury occurs once it is established
that the landlord retained possession and control.30
Even where two or more tenants or a tenant and a landlord
do use a porch, mere occasional use alone is not enough to show
that the porch is for the common use of the tenants.31 Use of
the tenant's porch by the landlord so as to conveniently reach
the roof3 2 or by another tenant who did not have a porch 33 or
by another tenant who used the porch to haul furniture up onto
the porch and then hauled the furniture from the porch through
an upper floor window 34 is not enough to show that the landlord
retained possession and control of the porch. These cases ap-
pear to indicate that if the use is but a singular act and not
repeated the landlord has not retained possession and control.
It seems difficult to justify a retention of possession and control
because of mere occasional use, yet this is enough in some
situations.35
Use of a porch by children for play purposes can justify a
finding that the landlord did not part with possession and con-
trol.36 Children appear to have a special place in the law, and
courts do not seem to have any difficulty in allowing the children
to recover.
29 Petrillo v. Maiuri, 138 Conn. 557, 86 A. 2d 869 (1952); Forguet v. De
Sante, 110 Conn. 367, 148 A. 139 (1930).
30 Lubritsky v. Lonergan, 140 Conn. 300, 99 A. 2d 187 (1953); Gill v.
Jakstas, 325 Mass. 309, 90 N. E. 2d 527 (1949); Schneider v. Dubinsky Realty
Co., 344 Mo. 654, 127 S. W. 2d 691 (1939); Forguet v. De Sante, 110 Conn.
367, 148 A. 139 (1930); Miller v. Geeser, 180 S. W. 3 (Mo. App. 1915),
rehear. den. Nov. 23, 1915.
31 Peterson v. Brune, 273 S. W. 2d 278 (Mo., 1954).
32 Kilmer v. White, 254 N. Y. 64, 171 N. E. 908 (1930).
33 Ludder v. Schwartzs, 291 Mass. 320, 196 N. E. 870 (1935); Cohen v. White,
206 Ky. 209, 266 S. W. 1078 (1924).
34 Condon v. Winn, 252 Mass. 146, 147 N. E. 562 (1925).
35 See footnotes 9 and 10.
36 Bolcar v. Muntz, 119 N. J. L. 219, 195 A. 619 (1937), aff'd. 120 N. J. L.
186, 198 A. 847 (1938); Widing v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 95 Minn. 279,
104 N. W. 239 (1905).
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The use of a post of a porch to attach clothes lines is more
than mere occasional use when done by several tenants, and is
thus a reservation by the landlord. 37 But when done by one
tenant after obtaining permission from the other tenant of a two
family dwelling it is not.38
Simply because a particular apartment or room is vacant
at the time of injury has been seized upon by the landlord to
argue that the passageway, stairway or porch cannot be in com-
mon because only one tenant has been using it. The courts have
rejected this argument with various answers. One court asks,
"Will the way be in common when the tenancy comes into
existence?" 39 Another court has stated that the common way
does not fluctuate with the renting of rooms or apartment.40
An empty tenement does not give the sole tenant the right to
occupy or control any of the empty tenements.41 The best
answer appears to be that the landlord will be presumed to
reserve possession for the benefit of all who will have occasion
to use the premise.42
When a yard, porch or stairway is used in common, the
theory has been advanced that because some other area sought
to be included as common rested upon the common way, it is
part and parcel of it. Simply because steps rest upon a common
yard43 or because a porch is supported by the posts of the com-
mon porch below 44 is not enough to show that the landlord re-
tained possession and control.
37 Boletho v. Muntz, 106 N. J. L. 449, 148 A. 737 (1930).
38 Johnson v. Swarts, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 716 (1941). In a somewhat similar
fact situation and decision, the court raised the question whether the right
to use the upstairs clothes line went with the downstairs tenement.
Spyredakis v. Poore, 94 N. H. 11, 45 A. 2d 220 (1946).
39 Cuscuna v. Road, 289 Mass. 213, 193 N. E. 795 (1935).
40 Dillehay v. Minor, 188 Iowa 37, 175 N. W. 838 (1920).
41 Papakalos v. Shake, 91 N. H. 265, 18 A. 2d 377 (1941).
42 Rice v. Ziegler, 128 Ohio St. 239, 190 N. E. 560 (1934).
43 Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N. E. 2d 545 (1949).
44 Pitts v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 160 Ohio St. 129, 113
N. E. 2d 869 (1953); Flanders v. New Hampshire Savings Bank, 90 N. H.
285, 7 A. 2d 233 (1939).
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